Abstract: Partisan misperceptions are widespread in American democracy. This registered report introduces and investigates the efficacy of a novel form of misperception correction known as “admissions-as-corrections.” I define admissions-as-corrections as a correction wherein the very source that spreads misinformation admits their falsehood. I theorize that admissions-as-corrections will effectively reduce misperceptions due to high source credibility and surprising content. I test this theory through two well-powered survey experiments of American Republicans and independents designed to reduce widely held misperceptions concerning the 2020 presidential election and the 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School. Using revelations uncovered as part of civil defamation cases filed against conservative media actors who spread this misinformation, I show that admissions-as-corrections reduce all tested misperceptions, decrease trust in sources of misinformation, and reduce the intended consumption of partisan media in the future. Admissions-as-corrections represent a promising new strategy in the fight against dangerous partisan misperceptions.

Abstract: Misinformation about events surrounding the 2020 election and the COVID-19 pandemic pose an existential threat to American democracy and public health. Public opinion surveys reveal that high percentages of Republicans indicate that they endorse some aspects of mistaken beliefs surrounding election fraud in the 2020 election. Still, understanding how to measure the endorsement of misperceptions is critical for understanding the threat at hand. Are high levels of mistaken beliefs genuinely held, or are they partially a function of expressive responding? I address this question through a set of survey experiments encouraging accuracy oriented processing among the general public. Using well-powered surveys of Republicans and Independents, I find that treatments designed to encourage more accurate responses are ineffective in reducing endorsement of partisan electoral and public health misperceptions and can in some cases even backfire. These findings suggest that support for these misperceptions are genuinely held.

Abstract: Right-wing populists have emerged and endured in a wide range of democracies, threatening democracy through their attacks on liberal institutions. Yet beyond these proximate threats, relatively little attention is paid to the effect of populism’s success on individual attitudes—in particular, the attitudes of the non-populist electorate. This article addresses this gap, exploring populism’s role in shaping democratic satisfaction in two recent electoral populist wins: the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK and the 2017 election of the far-right, populist Alternative für Deutschland in Germany. Leveraging high quality panel data surrounding each event, we reveal the mainstream electorate experiences a decline in democratic satisfaction after a populist win. Moreover, we reveal this democratic decline is not an artefact of losing an election but a direct effect of a rightwing populist electoral victory. These findings reveal right-wing populism can threaten democratic support even among their erstwhile opponents.

Abstract: Political scientists and social movement scholars have long been interested in the effects that media framings have on support for controversial speech. Recently, the concept of cancel culture has complicated our understanding of free speech. In particular, the modern Republican Party under Donald Trump has made “fighting cancel culture” a cornerstone of its electoral strategy. We use a nationally representative survey experiment to assess whether individuals’ opposition to cancel culture is principled or contingent on the ideological identity of the speaker. We show that framing speech restrictions as the consequence of cancel culture does not increase support for free speech among Republicans. Further, when leftwing groups utilize cancel culture framings, Republicans become even less supportive of those groups’ free speech rights. These findings cast doubt on the sincerity of Republicans’ commitment to the term cancel culture.

Abstract This article examined the history of the use of populist frames in American presidential campaign discourse in order to answer a set of interrelated questions about how populist discourse is constructed and employed. Using a novel database of presidential campaign speeches (n = 189) from 63 major candidates from 1896 to 2016, I coded these speeches for presence or absence of a set of 11 populist frames. Mokken scale analysis was conducted to determine if populist discourse is “built” in a logical way by political candidates. Regression analysis was conducted to measure if outsider candidates were more likely to employ populist framing. Eight of the 11 frames comprise a stable Mokken scale that measures populist discourse. Results show that anti-bureaucratic and nativist frames do not load onto the same factor as other populist frames, suggesting that they may be measuring a separate concept. Candidates are more likely to use generic, less threatening aspects of the populist frame than they are to use illiberal, “risky” frames. Less experienced and third-party candidates are also more likely to use populist discourse. Populism is a flexible but coherent set of discursive frames present across modern campaign history. Populist framings are most commonly utilized by outsider candidates.'